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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 La‟Vada Cruse appeals her judgment of sentence after pleading guilty to one count 
of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, two counts of tax evasion in violation of 
26 U.S.C. § 7201, and one count of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1028A(a)(1) and (c)(5).  Cruse challenges the District Court‟s decision not to group the 
mail fraud and tax evasion counts for sentencing purposes, the District Court‟s 
consideration of mitigating factors and the reasonableness of her sentence.  For the 




 From December 2003 through May 2007, Cruse engaged in a mail fraud scheme, 
where she stole the identities of her friends and relatives to apply for more than ninety 
student loans, totaling approximately $1.7 million.  Seventeen of those loan applications 
were approved, from which Cruse received $192,165.52.  Cruse also failed to report the 
illicit proceeds from her scheme as taxable income.   
On July 28, 2011, Cruse pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one 
count of mail fraud, two counts of tax evasion and one count of aggravated identity theft.  
The plea agreement stipulated that the actual loss from the mail fraud was $192,165.52 
and the tax loss was $40,010.   
At sentencing, the District Court determined that the Sentencing Guidelines range 
was 61 to 70 months, based upon a Criminal History Category of I and a total offense 
                                              
1
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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level of 21.  The District Court noted that Cruse sought a variance to a sentence of 
approximately 48 months, but determined that a sentence of 61 months, which was at the 
bottom of the Guidelines range, was appropriate.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 In her opening brief, Cruse argued that the District Court should have grouped the 
mail fraud and tax evasion counts together for sentencing purposes pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 3D1.2(d), and that this would have resulted in a lower Guidelines range.  In her reply 
brief, Cruse concedes that grouping the counts would not result in a lower Guidelines 
range.  Therefore, even if the District Court erred in not grouping the counts, this error 
was harmless because it did not change the Guidelines range calculation, and did not 
affect Cruse‟s substantial rights.  See United States v. Isaac, 655 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 
2011); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).   
III. 
 Cruse argues that her sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the District 
Court unduly weighed the need for general deterrence and because it failed to 
meaningfully consider her mitigation arguments, including her youth, immaturity, and 
mental state at the time of the offense.  We review the District Court‟s sentence for abuse 
of discretion.  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  A sentencing judge 
must include enough in the record so that an appellate court may be satisfied that he 
considered the parties‟ arguments, but the judge is not required to set forth every detail on 
which he relied.  See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007) (citing United 
States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336-37 (1988)). 
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 The District Court meaningfully considered all of Cruse‟s arguments for 
mitigation, including Dr. Heilbrun‟s psychological evaluation and Cruse‟s youth, 
immaturity and state of mind at the time of the offense.  Additionally, the District Court 
articulated valid reasons for the sentence concerning general deterrence.  The record of 
Cruse‟s allocution and the Court‟s discussion satisfies us that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.   
 Lastly, Cruse argues that her sentence is substantively unreasonable.  “The abuse-
of-discretion standard applies to both our procedural and substantive reasonableness 
inquiries.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing 
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).  “[A]bsent any significant procedural error, we must give „due 
deference to the district court‟s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,‟ 
justify the sentence.”  Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).  The District Court meaningfully 
assessed the totality of the facts in this case and imposed a reasonable sentence.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion. 
V. 
 For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District 
Court.  
